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RULEMAKING VERSUS ADJUDICATION: A 
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
JEFFREY J. RACHLINSKI* 
ABSTRACT 
 Legal systems make law in one of two ways: by abstracting general 
principles from the decisions made in individual cases (through the ad-
judicative process) or by declaring general principles through a central-
ized authority that are to be applied in individual cases (through the 
rulemaking process). Administrative agencies have long had the unfet-
tered authority to choose between the two methods. Although each 
method could identify the same solution to the legal issues that come be-
fore them, in practice, the two systems commonly settle upon different 
resolutions. Each system presents the underlying legal issue from a dif-
ferent cognitive perspective, highlighting and hiding different aspects of 
a legal problem. These differences produce different resolutions to legal 
problems. The single-case perspective of adjudication seems, in many 
ways, cognitively inferior to the broad perspectives that legislatures can 
incorporate into their decisionmaking processes. The adjudicative ap-
proach, however, has advantages that are less obvious. Notably, the ad-
judicative process is more likely to facilitate the adoption of simple, ele-
gant rules for decisionmaking. The assessment of which approach is su-
perior is, therefore, indeterminate. Each has its strengths and weak-
nesses that make it more or less appropriate for different contexts. 
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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 Administrative agencies can develop law in two distinct ways: ad-
judication and rulemaking. An agency relying on adjudication will 
function much like a common law court. It will develop a body of 
                                                                                                                    
 * Professor of Law, Cornell Law School; B.A., Johns Hopkins, 1988; M.A. (Psychol-
ogy), 1988; J.D., Stanford, 1993; Ph.D. (Psychology), Stanford 1994. I thank the partici-
pants in this Symposium for their helpful comments. 
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caselaw that will allow affected parties to infer general principles 
from the outcomes of the cases. By contrast, an agency relying on 
rulemaking will function much like a legislature. It will promulgate 
abstract rules in detail and then expect adjudicative bodies to apply 
those rules in individual cases. For an agency, the two approaches 
each have well-known advantages and disadvantages.1 What is less 
well-known, or at least less widely appreciated, is that these two ap-
proaches to making law present the underlying issues that agencies 
address in such dramatically different psychological perspectives 
that the choice between the two approaches will bias the decision-
maker toward different solutions. The choice of policymaking in-
struments thus might have unintended effects on the substantive 
law that agencies create. 
 Federal administrative agencies in the United States have long 
had wide discretion to choose between rulemaking and adjudication 
as their tool for adopting a particular regulatory policy.2 Even when 
rulemaking seems sensible, courts will permit agencies to adopt pol-
icy through case-by-case adjudication.3 Most agencies also possess 
congressionally delegated authority to adopt substantive rules 
through administrative rulemaking procedures that will have the full 
force of law behind them.4 With few exceptions, neither the courts 
nor Congress have placed any meaningful restrictions on a federal 
agency’s power to choose between rulemaking and adjudication.5 
Furthermore, the standard of review of agency decisions is essen-
tially identical, whether the agency has used either the rulemaking 
or adjudication process.6  
 Federal agencies have made full use of this discretion to choose 
among policymaking instruments. Some agencies, notably the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB), make policy largely through 
the adjudication process, while others, notably the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA), proceed largely through the rulemaking 
                                                                                                                    
 1. See M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1383 (2004) (providing a detailed discussion of the implications of agency rulemaking ver-
sus adjudication). 
 2. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202-03 (1947).  
 3. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267, 292-95 (1974).  
 4. See Nat’l Petroleum Refiners Ass’n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672, 676 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 5. Agencies, of course, also have other means at their disposal to influence the be-
havior of the community that they regulate. They can draft informal policy memos, the of-
ficials who run the agencies can make public declarations of policies, or the agency can 
jawbone the targets of regulations through direct contact. Even though such methods are 
useful, they lead to more ephemeral policy than rulemaking or adjudication. When an 
agency wants to adopt lasting policy that binds the regulated community, it must promul-
gate a rule or develop law through the adjudication process. Robert A. Anthony, Interpre-
tive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should Federal Agencies 
Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1355 (1992). 
 6. Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 
745 F.2d 677, 681-86 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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process. Others combine the two procedures, making some policies 
through adjudication and others through rulemaking. 
 Implicit in the deference that both Congress and the courts have 
shown to agencies as to the choice between rulemaking and adjudica-
tion is faith that the agency itself is in the best position to identify 
the appropriate means of proceeding. An agency’s choice of policy-
making instruments, however, probably does not reflect a straight-
forward effort to identify the method that will produce the best sub-
stantive decision. The agency will be primarily concerned with choos-
ing a policymaking method that will allow it to be efficient and yet 
survive judicial review.  
 Each technique also has advantages and disadvantages for the 
agency. Policies adopted through rulemaking cannot be applied ret-
roactively; hence an agency that believes that it cannot easily predict 
the problems it will encounter might choose to proceed by adjudica-
tion. Policies adopted through adjudication, however, are often less 
definitive, thereby making it harder for the targets of the agency’s 
regulatory effort to conform their conduct to the policy that the 
agency is attempting to adopt. A change in agency policy adopted 
through adjudication can also come as quite a surprise to the first 
party to whom it is applied. Courts sometimes deem it unacceptable 
for the agency to penalize the first entity that violates a new policy 
announced through adjudication.7 The Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA)8 also creates differences between the two processes. The APA 
explicitly insists that an independent administrative law judge pre-
sides over an adjudication—a requirement not duplicated by the 
rulemaking processes.9 This requirement, however, applies largely to 
the trial-level decisionmaker in an adjudication. The appeals process 
will eventually allow the agency itself to interject its policy concerns 
into the process. Likewise, even though ex parte contact and influ-
ence by political entities is thought to be less appropriate in an adju-
dicatory proceeding than in rulemaking, once again, this applies 
largely to the initial trial-level determination and not to the appeals 
process.  
 Several agencies have turned to adjudication out of sheer frustra-
tion with the rulemaking process. Notably, frustration with the slow 
pace of the rulemaking process ultimately led the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) to rely increasingly on an adjudicative ap-
proach.10 The SEC now largely makes policy through the use of 
                                                                                                                    
 7. Epilepsy Found. v. NLRB, 268 F.3d 1095, 1102-03 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
 8. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000). 
 9. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 554 with 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
 10. ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND 
EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA (1982) (describing the Securities and Ex-
change Commission’s evolution toward adjudication). 
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prosecutorial discretion, rather than through the rulemaking proc-
ess.11 Similarly, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
makes its safety policies largely by issuing and defending recalls of 
vehicles it considers unsafe, rather than by issuing clear rules con-
cerning auto safety.12 Thus the choice of adjudication versus rule-
making reflects a mix of expedience, frustration, politics, and history.  
 Ideally, the choice of policymaking instruments would not affect 
the underlying substantive policy the agency adopts. If the NLRB be-
lieves that the National Labor Relations Act is best interpreted as 
forbidding an employer from undertaking an informal poll of the un-
ion members to determine if they still support the union,13 it should 
be able to reach that conclusion through rulemaking just as surely as 
it would through adjudication. The courts defer to an agency’s choice 
of policymaking instruments, in large part, because judges fully un-
derstand the minefield in which the agencies operate. Agencies are in 
the best position to choose the appropriate course of action. Implicit 
in such a delegation of choice, however, is that the choice reflects 
only an effort to navigate the legal and political challenges and does 
not bias an agency toward one policy or another. Courts are sensitive 
to reviewing factors that might influence an agency’s substantive 
mandate even as they are deferential to the agency’s choice of proce-
dure. Given good cause to believe that the agency’s choice of proce-
dure influences the substantive outcome, then it too might become 
the target of greater judicial, or even legislative, scrutiny.  
 The two approaches likely produce different psychological deci-
sionmaking styles that facilitate different solutions to social dilem-
mas. The “representational structure” of the social problem differs 
depending upon whether an agency confronts the issue with rule-
making or adjudication. Adjudication will invariably highlight the 
individual litigant’s story, while rulemaking will focus attention on 
broader, structural aspects of the problem. To be sure, this distinc-
tion is relative. No adjudication proceeds without some attention to 
the broader policy implications that the decision might have, and no 
rulemaking proceeds without some awareness of how individuals 
might be affected. Relative to a rulemaking, however, an adjudica-
tion will focus the decisionmaker’s gaze upon the individual case, 
rather than the sociological, economic, or other structural aspects of 
the underlying issue. This difference in focus might thereby facilitate 
different resolutions of the underlying issue. 
                                                                                                                    
 11. Id. at 95 (describing the SEC’s “predilection for formulating regulatory policy 
through the prosecution of enforcement cases”). 
 12. JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY (1990) 
(describing the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration’s evolution toward adjudi-
cation). 
 13. Allentown Mack Sales & Serv., Inc. v. NLRB, 522 U.S. 359, 361-63 (1998). 
2005]                   RULEMAKING VERSUS ADJUDICATION 533 
 
 This factor has gone largely unnoticed in administrative caselaw. 
As noted, courts defer to agency choice of policymaking instruments, 
but they review rigorously the record created in an effort to ensure 
rationality in agency decisionmaking. As such, courts assess whether 
the record itself is adequate to support the agency’s choice in what-
ever form it exists. Decades of research in cognitive psychology, how-
ever, suggest that the form in which information is presented can 
sometimes affect choice as much as the information itself. The judi-
cial failure to assess whether the choice between adjudication and 
rulemaking is sensible is thus an oversight. Cognitive psychological 
research suggests that the choice of instruments matters tremen-
dously, and thus should be reviewed no less thoroughly than the in-
formation in the record itself. 
 This Article develops and defends this thesis. Part II outlines the 
effect that the cognitive structure of a problem can have on decision-
making. Part III discusses the cognitive difficulties that the adjudi-
cative approach presents, and Part IV reviews the cognitive difficul-
ties that the rulemaking approach presents. Part V concludes by as-
sessing the factors that would indicate whether rulemaking or adju-
dication is more appropriate from a psychological perspective. 
II.   COGNITIVE STRUCTURE AND SOCIAL DECISIONS 
 Decisionmaking problems embody cognitive features that facili-
tate or impede different resolutions. For example, a decision that ap-
pears to reflect a choice among positive gains from the status quo bi-
ases decisionmakers toward making risk-averse choices, whereas a 
decision that appears to reflect a choice among negative losses from 
the status quo biases decisionmakers toward risk-seeking options.14 
Consider the well-known “Asian Flu Problem” from Kahneman and 
Tversky: 
Imagine that the U.S. is preparing for the outbreak of an unusual 
Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 people. Two alternative 
programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that 
the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the program 
are as follows: 
If Program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. . . .  
If Program B is adopted, there is a one-third probability that 600 
people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people 
will be saved.15 
                                                                                                                    
 14. Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 342-43 (1984). 
 15. Id. at 343. 
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When the options are described in this fashion, most people prefer 
the risk-averse option of saving 200 people.16 By contrast, consider 
the options as described below: 
If Program C is adopted, 400 people will die. . . . 
If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that no-
body will die and a two-thirds probability that 600 people will 
die.17 
When the options are described in this fashion, most people prefer 
the risk-seeking option of a one-third chance of nobody dying.18 The 
choices, though identical, depend upon whether the decision’s 
“frame” constitutes a choice among gains or a choice among losses.19 
 Decisionmakers can even be distracted by irrelevant items 
through what psychologists refer to as “contrast effects.” As Kelman 
and his coauthors put it, “A person who prefers chicken over pasta 
should not change this preference on learning that fish is also avail-
able.”20 And yet, choices are commonly found to depend upon an ir-
relevant context. In one example, a greater percentage of under-
graduates choosing between six dollars and a Cross pen favored the 
pen when a third alternative—a less attractive pen—was available.21 
In Kelman’s research, preferences for criminal penalties changed 
when inferior penalties were offered.22 For example, people choosing 
to sentence an unethical real estate broker for misconduct were less 
likely to choose prison time versus probation plus community service 
when a third option of probation plus counseling became available.23  
 Research such as this demonstrates clearly that context affects 
choice. But can context also lead people astray? In these studies, 
there is no right or wrong answer. It is not clear whether it is better 
to try to save all 600 lives or to save 200 for sure. Neither is a par-
ticular criminal sentence necessarily the right penalty. These studies 
indicate that the presentation format matters more than we might 
think, but they do not, by themselves, indicate that different formats 
are more or less suited to quality decisionmaking.  
 Evidence exists, however, that some approaches to decisions are 
superior to others. For example, Gerd Gigerenzer has noted that 
Bayesian problems with correct answers can be made much easier to 
                                                                                                                    
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 287, 287 (1996). 
 21. Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Ex-
tremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281, 287 (1992).  
 22. Kelman et al., supra note 20, at 301-03. 
 23. Id. at 296-97. 
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solve by simply rearranging the information provided.24 As the prime 
example, consider the “rare disease” problem:25 Suppose a doctor per-
forms a test for a rare disease on a patient. The test is ninety-nine 
percent accurate and the disease occurs in one in 1000 patients with 
that patient’s profile. If the patient tests positive, what is the likeli-
hood that the patient has the disease? The answer most people give 
is ninety-nine percent, but the real answer is actually less than ten 
percent. The reason is that in a rare illness, false positive results are 
incredibly common. In a population of 1000 people, only one has the 
illness, but one percent of the other 999 (or roughly ten people) will 
also test positive. Even though the one person with the illness tests 
positive as well, this means that any given population of 1000 people 
will produce eleven positive test results which include only one per-
son who actually has the illness. As can be seen from this account, 
presenting the frequencies in the answer makes the problem much 
easier to understand and reduces misconceptions about the meaning 
of a positive test result.  
 Similarly, Leda Cosmides and John Tooby have noted that the 
apparent difficulty of such problems as the Wason selection task are 
easily avoided when the context of the problem is changed from the 
abstract to real-world situations.26 The Wason selection task runs as 
follows: Four cards are laid out with letters on one side and numbers 
on the other. The face-up side of the four cards read “D,” “F,” “3,” and 
“7.” The task is to determine which cards need to be turned over to 
ascertain whether the following proposition is true: All cards that 
have “D” on one side have a “3” on the other. A majority of people 
faced with this task choose the card reading “D” and the card reading 
“3.”27 In fact, the answer is the card reading “D” and the card reading 
“7.” The card reading “3” could have any letter on the opposite side 
without falsifying the hypothesis, and hence it is not useful. But if 
the card with the “7” on it has a “D” on the opposite side, then the as-
sertion is false, and hence it must be examined.  
 If the cards are given different labels, however, the problem be-
comes easy. Suppose that the cards are labeled on one side with ei-
ther the phrase “drinking coke” or “drinking beer” and on the oppo-
site side with either “16 years old” or “25 years old.”28 Also suppose 
that the cards are said to describe the age and beverage of people 
seated at a bar in a restaurant and the task is to ascertain which 
                                                                                                                    
 24. GERD GIGERENZER, CALCULATED RISKS: HOW TO KNOW WHEN NUMBERS DECEIVE 
YOU 40-51 (2002) (describing how to represent Bayesian decisions as natural frequencies). 
 25. Ward Cascalls et al., Interpretation by Physicians of Clinical Laboratory Results, 
299 NEW ENG. J. MED. 999 (1978). 
 26. Leda Cosmides & John Tooby, Cognitive Adaptations for Social Exchange, in THE 
ADAPTED MIND 163, 181-84 (Jerome H. Barkow et al. eds., 1992).  
 27. Id. at 181. 
 28. Id. at 183. 
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cards need to be turned over to determine whether the drinking-age 
law (twenty-one years) is enforced in this restaurant. Structurally, 
the problem is the same as the Wason selection task, but it is far eas-
ier. Most people correctly recognize that the cards reading “16 years 
old” and “drinking beer” need to be examined.29 Even though turning 
over the card with the “3” on it in the first task was compelling, the 
beverage of the twenty-five-year-old is obviously uninteresting be-
cause he or she cannot be breaking the law. Adding a context that 
embodies the script of this familiar setting makes the logic transpar-
ent.  
 The context surrounding a problem can thus make it easier or 
harder to reach the correct result. Context has this effect because it 
highlights or hides aspects of the problem. The probabilistic form of 
the rare-disease problem hides the high number of false positives, 
whereas the frequentist presentation puts false positives front and 
center. The drinking-age context of the Wason selection task focuses 
attention on finding violations of a rule, which is what is needed for 
hypothesis testing. Context and imagery, however, can also be mis-
leading. Consider the following two problems:30  
A. Imagine two perfect spheres floating in empty space; one is the 
size of a basketball and the other is the size of the planet Earth. 
Tightly wrapped around the equator of each is a string. A scientist 
wants to lengthen each string so that rather than tightly 
wrapped, the string hovers exactly one foot above the surface of 
each sphere at all points around it. Which sphere would require 
the most string to accomplish this, the basketball-sized sphere or 
the Earth-sized sphere; or is the amount of string needed the 
same for both? 
 B. Two variables, x and y, are defined by the following equations: 
x = 2π(r1 +1) - 2π r1 
y = 2π(r2 +1) - 2π r2 
Where r1 = 8,000 and r 2 = 1 
 Which of the following is true: x > y, x < y, or x = y? 
Intuitively, in problem A, the answer seems like it should be that 
more string is needed for the Earth-sized sphere, but the answer is 
that the same amount is needed for both (2π feet is needed in each 
case).31 When the same problem is stated algebraically, however, as 
                                                                                                                    
 29. Id. 
 30. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Gains, Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 113, 126 n.57 (1996). 
 31. Because the circumference of any circle is equal to 2πr and the task requires 
lengthening the radius of each circle by one foot, the amount of string needed (x) is defined 
by the equation: x = 2π(r + 1) - 2πr, which reduces to 2π. Id.  
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in problem B, a little algebraic manipulation quickly leads to the 
right answer. Here, the imagery of the earth and the basketball di-
rects attention away from the correct answer.  
 Even as to questions that have no correct answer, one set of con-
textual cues might be said to be better than another. In the contrast 
problem involving the Cross pen, it might be the case that most un-
dergraduates fail to understand or appreciate that Cross pens are 
really a cut above ordinary pens. The addition of the inferior pen to 
the mix makes the Cross pen appear as it should appear—as a fancy 
pen. Similarly, in the framing-effects problem, it might be that the 
gains frame, on its own, fails to convey the full weight of the safe 
choice of saving 200 lives, which is to condemn 400 people to certain 
death. The loss frame makes this clear, but perhaps the loss frame 
makes the weight of such a decision foolishly unbearable. In fact, for 
framing problems, psychologists often suggest adopting efforts to re-
cast problems into the opposite frame and to reconsider them.32  
 Regulating by adjudication is likely to create a different cognitive 
context than regulating by rulemaking. Adjudication’s case-by-case 
approach is apt to divert attention away from general systemic vari-
ables, highlighting instead the personalities and unique features of 
the individual case. Rulemaking’s abstract approach is apt to do the 
opposite by hiding individual stories while highlighting systemic 
variables. For certain kinds of problems, the adjudicative approach 
might thwart the goals of the legal system. For others, the regulatory 
approach might be more troublesome. In other cases, it might simply 
be the case that each leads to different answers that cannot be said 
to be inferior or superior from a normative perspective. 
 Consider how this might operate with an example of a typical 
agency action. In deciding how to regulate the sale of smoked fish, 
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) must set standards for 
processing fish so as to protect the public from adverse health effects 
associated with improperly cooked fish.33 In so doing, the FDA might 
promulgate a rule identifying how smoked fish is to be processed. 
The rule might include such features as a minimum cooking time 
and temperature for fish to ensure that the process kills potentially 
harmful bacteria. Alternatively, the FDA might decide to act, case-
by-case, against processors of smoked fish whom it believes use proc-
esses inadequate to kill harmful bacteria. The choice of policymaking 
instrument will emphasize different aspects of the regulatory prob-
lem. Should it proceed by rulemaking, the FDA will focus its atten-
                                                                                                                    
 32. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial 
Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 822-23 (2001) (suggesting that judges could benefit from 
considering multiple perspectives on the issues presented to them). 
 33. See United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977). 
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tion on structural variables such as the historical rates of food poi-
soning associated with smoked fish and the costs to the industry of 
complying with regulation. The decision is apt to be quite abstract, 
and the agency is quite likely to focus on adopting a generic rule for 
the industry with few exceptions. In contrast, should it proceed 
against an individual manufacturer, the decision will be much more 
concrete. The target of the enforcement action might well present in-
dividual variations that make the agency much more willing to make 
an individualized decision. One might suppose, for example, that the 
FDA would be more likely to adopt species-specific cooking require-
ments for the smoked fish industry if it proceeds the way a court 
would than if it approaches the problem the way a legislature would. 
 The notion that an agency could reach a different policy conclu-
sion depending upon whether it proceeds by adjudication or rulemak-
ing might not be troubling. Each approach to policymaking has 
strengths and weaknesses. Just as the mathematical perspective is 
better suited to the string problem than the verbal perspective, the 
cognitive perspective that rulemaking creates might provide a supe-
rior perspective on a regulatory problem to that of adjudication. For 
other regulatory problems, the reverse might be true. If administra-
tive agencies adopt the mechanism that is best suited to identifying 
the most sensible substantive policies, then the diverging perspec-
tives are a strength, not a weakness. In contrast, if an agency is us-
ing a method that produces a misleading focus, then it might facili-
tate the adoption of an incorrect substantive conclusion. An agency 
that does not attend to the potential limitations of each perspective 
might choose a policy tool that is ill-suited to resolving the substan-
tive policy question it must resolve. Determining the right tool thus 
requires an assessment of the cognitive limitations of adjudication 
and rulemaking. 
III.   THE COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS OF ADJUDICATION 
 From the cognitive perspective, the adjudicative approach to mak-
ing legal rules has four defects relative to the rulemaking approach. 
First, adjudication necessarily entails a single-case perspective, 
which might blind the decisionmaker to the broader policy implica-
tions. Second, the single-case approach might introduce misleading 
details into the decisionmaking process. Factors that should not af-
fect broader policy might influence the outcome of an individual case. 
Although an agency might be sensitive to this problem, the potential 
for a decisionmaker to rely on misleading factors is present in any 
adjudication. Third, adjudications involve determinations concerning 
real people who can produce sympathy or enmity in an adjudicator. 
Emotional reactions to individuals rather than dispassionate analy-
sis of policy is apt to play more of a role in an adjudication than in a 
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rulemaking. Finally, an adjudication will focus the decisionmaker’s 
attention on the allocation of responsibility, perhaps leading to ex-
cessive attributions of responsibility to individuals rather than cir-
cumstances beyond individuals’ control. 
A.   The Single-Case Perspective 
 Taking issues one case at a time limits a decisionmaker’s ability 
to identify a broader policy perspective. Assessing legal problems one 
case at a time can also distort a sense of scale and proportion. Out-
side of the legal context, psychologists have demonstrated that mak-
ing judgments of value on a continuous scale through the lens of in-
dividual cases is challenging.34 For example, one study demonstrated 
that individuals asked to state how much they were willing to pay for 
seven ounces of ice cream sold in a five-ounce cup provided higher es-
timates than individuals asked to state how much they were willing 
to pay for eight ounces of ice cream sold in a ten-ounce cup.35 When 
making the judgments individually, people judged the seven ounces 
of ice cream to be a good value, being that it overflowed the small 
cup.36 The eight ounces of ice cream, in contrast, seemed like a poor 
value, being that it failed to fill the cup in which it was sold.37 When 
asked to make the judgments together, however, almost all of the 
participants assigned a higher dollar value to the eight ounces of ice 
cream.38 Taken together, people sensibly focused on the important 
variable—how much ice cream was available.39 In this study, the 
judgment made one cup at a time proved to be misleading.  
 Similar results have been documented in legal settings. Sunstein 
and his coauthors found such effects for punitive damage assess-
ments.40 In their study, people assigned punitive damages in either a 
fraud case involving financial losses or a products liability case in-
volving physical injuries.41 The fraud case was written so as to seem 
outrageous compared to most cases of fraud (making it analogous to 
the seven ounces in the five-ounce cup). The products liability case 
was written so as to seem somewhat benign compared to most in-
stances of injuries caused by defective products (making it analogous 
to the eight ounces in the ten-ounce cup). When evaluated sepa-
rately, subjects assigned slightly higher damage awards in the prod-
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ucts liability case than in the fraud case.42 When evaluated together, 
the damage awards in the fraud case did not significantly change; 
however, the products liability case drew substantially higher dam-
age awards than when it was evaluated in isolation.43 When the par-
ticipants in the study evaluated the two cases together, they were 
reminded that reckless conduct that inflicts physical injuries is more 
outrageous than reckless conduct that inflicts only financial inju-
ries.44 Thus, the more prominent harm elicited a smaller punitive 
damage award when judged by itself than when directly compared to 
a less prominent harm.45 This result has also been replicated using 
prison terms in criminal cases.46 
 Misleading contrasts such as those described by Sunstein and his 
coauthors are the product of making decisions one case at a time. It 
would be hard for an adjudicative body not to have a sense of 
whether an individual case before it was more or less extreme in 
some dimension than the typical type of case. Any one securities 
fraud case might seem more or less egregious than a typical securi-
ties case, regardless of how terrible a “crime” the case is in a broader 
sense.47 Or imagine the perspective of the United States Fish and 
Wildlife Service (FWS) in deciding how to craft penalties in a case in 
which a rancher intentionally shoots and kills a grizzly bear.48 From 
the perspective of the FWS, which spends much of its efforts on ac-
tions that have indirect, unintentional effects on species, the deliber-
ate killing of the bear will seem to merit one of the more severe pen-
alties the agency has available under the Endangered Species Act. 
The FWS might not stop to think about how culpable the action truly 
is in the broader context of its mission. Intentional killings of grizzly 
bears are rare (not to mention dangerous) and are far less a threat to 
grizzly bears than the loss of species habitat. If the FWS makes pol-
icy through this single case, its policy might be misguided.  
 Worse yet, as Sunstein and his coauthors noted, the FWS might 
not make any effort to compare the penalty for the rancher to penal-
ties other agencies impose in far more socially destructive cases.49 
For example, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) might consider a manufacturer’s failure to install yellow 
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tape on a staircase in its factory to be a trivial safety violation and 
not even penalize the manufacturer. From OSHA’s perspective, this 
is a minor failing, but it is probably a more socially destructive over-
sight than the deliberate killing of an endangered bear. Agencies op-
erating one case at a time, within their own domain, are apt to find it 
difficult to achieve a sense of scale or proportion for their regulatory 
efforts. At least, they will find it harder to do so than an agency op-
erating by rulemaking.  
 Logical reasoning is generally more troublesome in an individual 
case than in the aggregate. Common fallacies of reasoning such as 
the conjunctive fallacy, base-rate neglect, and overconfidence are less 
prevalent when the underlying decision is treated as being one of a 
category of decisions.50 Furthermore, presenting statistical evidence 
in the format of frequencies (for example, one in ten) often produces a 
more rational reasoning process than statistical evidence presented 
in the format of subjective probability (for example, ten percent).51 
Single cases, however, are apt to trigger a subjective format and hide 
the commonalities a case might have with a broader category. An ad-
judicative approach will seem to present a unique problem, whereas 
a rulemaking approach clearly requires a decision that should apply 
to an aggregation of cases.  
B.   The Focus on Unique Features of a Case 
 Making policy through individual cases can give unique features 
of a case the power to suggest outcomes that would not be adopted 
through a rulemaking proceeding. Decisions in the individual case 
can often be influenced more easily by misleading extraneous factors 
than decisions in the aggregate. Consider the influence of what psy-
chologists call counterfactual thinking on judgment.52 Counterfactual 
thinking refers to the “mental undoing” of the details of a story as a 
means of understanding the story. The mental undoing of an antece-
dent event in a longer story will confer importance on that antece-
dent event, making it a source of emotion and attribution.53 Out-
comes are often the product of a long series of antecedent details. 
Some of the details are common to many similar scenarios and hence 
are important to such stories, but others might be unique. Because 
the features that make an antecedent event easy to undo are not al-
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ways well correlated with their true importance in the story, counter-
factual thinking can be misleading.  
 Consider a study of counterfactual thinking that illustrates the 
point.54 In the study, people were asked to determine the amount of 
compensation for the survivors of a deceased airplane passenger.55 
The materials noted that the airplane crashed in a remote northern 
wild.56 The passenger had initially survived the crash but succumbed 
to the bitter conditions as he struggled toward a settlement.57 Half of 
the study’s participants were told that the passenger died after walk-
ing to within seventy-five miles of the nearest settlement and the 
other half were told that the passenger died after walking to within 
one-quarter of a mile from the nearest settlement.58 People in the lat-
ter condition were willing to award more in compensation than peo-
ple in the former condition.59 The authors of this study explain that it 
is easier to imagine that the passenger could have survived when he 
made it but one-quarter of a mile from safety.60 Like a soldier killed 
on the last day of a long war, his death seems more regrettable and 
induces greater compensation.61  
 Adjudicative bodies invariably get access to the ephemeral details 
of a story that can then lead to misleading judgments. Suppose an 
agency had to decide whether it was appropriate to compensate the 
survivors of a pilot who died under similar circumstances as the pas-
senger in the study; perhaps because the plane was being flown un-
der a government agency contract and the question is whether the pi-
lot was a government employee. No agency would sensibly adopt a 
rule in which the status of the compensation would depend upon how 
far the person walked after the crash. And yet, if the hypothetical 
agency decided to use this case as a policy vehicle to create some 
precedent on the issue, the decision might depend upon how far the 
pilot walked. If operating through the rulemaking process, however, 
the individual facts of any one case would not be before the agency. 
C.   Sympathy and Empathy in Individual Cases 
 Individual cases also likely invoke misleading emotional re-
sponses. Adjudications necessarily involve individuals who can evoke 
sympathy or empathy that can lead a decisionmaker to adopt a rule 
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that arises from an emotional reaction to a specific individual rather 
than rational deliberation on the underlying issues.  
 The emotional reactions to a decision will seem entirely different 
in an individual case. Consider the difference between a proceeding 
involving a potential fine against an airline for an accident that re-
sulted in an individual’s death and a rulemaking proceeding on a 
safety precaution. Both the adjudication and the rulemaking are 
likely to include testimony on the relative costs and benefits of the 
safety device. The adjudication, however, will also include extensive 
individual testimony about the personal loss suffered by the victim’s 
family. The emotional content of individual testimony will make it 
difficult for the adjudicative body to put the implications of the air-
line’s failure to undertake the safety precaution in perspective. The 
adverse consequences of the absence of the safety precaution will be 
salient, while the costs of the precaution will seem pallid by compari-
son.  
 The heightened potential for emotional reactions that arises from 
the active presence of individuals in adjudication can skew the deci-
sionmaking process in unintentional ways as well. Psychologists 
have argued that in many cases people make decisions in reliance on 
an “affect heuristic.”62 That is, people sometimes experience a strong 
and immediate reaction to stimuli. This reaction then guides further 
assessment of related stimuli.63 An affective reaction to a party be-
fore an administrative proceeding can thereby lead to a decision 
based upon that emotional reaction. Furthermore, as Dan Simon has 
observed, legal decisionmakers struggle to maintain consistency. The 
consequence of an affective response might be greater than just a fa-
vorable decision on the merits that might have no effect on future 
cases. An adjudicative body that empathizes with a litigant is apt to 
adopt a rule that favors that litigant. Simon has noted just such a 
tendency in his research.64 In his research, people asked to adopt one 
of two competing legal rules favor the rule that supports litigants 
that they like and disfavors litigants that they dislike. Even though 
people could just side with favored litigants based on preferable fac-
tual conclusions, they tend to also favor them on legal conclusions.65  
 The annals of famous administrative law cases, in fact, include a 
prime example of exactly this type of motivated empathetic reason-
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ing. In O’Leary v. Brown-Pacific Maxon Inc.,66 an adjudicative body of 
the Department of Defense had to determine whether a surviving 
mother of a government contractor was entitled to survivor bene-
fits.67 The benefits were only available if the employee had died from 
activity within the scope of his employment.68 In fact, he had died 
when, while recreating on a beach within a military base, he tried to 
rescue two men stranded on a reef.69 Sympathy for the employee and 
his mother determined not only the outcome but the course of two 
separate bodies of law. An adjudicative body determined that his 
death had indeed occurred during the scope of his employment,70 
thereby creating precedent for other unfortunate victims of recrea-
tional activity. Furthermore, a reviewing court determined that the 
appropriate standard of review was one of deference to the adminis-
trative agency.71 Decades later, the precedent remains well-cited to 
support a whole range of administrative decisions.72 In all likelihood, 
all that the case really supports is the proposition that “surviving 
mothers get benefits.”73 Sympathy for an unfortunate parent, rather 
than reasoned assessment of the situation, created an influential 
precedent that is, at least in administrative law, a lingering nui-
sance.  
 A regulatory body acting through the rulemaking process cer-
tainly cannot be said to be occupied by people devoid of emotion. 
Rulemaking procedures on safety regulations include less testimony 
by individuals, however, than adjudication. A rulemaking proceeding 
also involves two other features that minimize the likely impact of 
emotional content on decisionmaking. First, it is prospective. Adjudi-
cative bodies act retrospectively and will thus always have injured 
victims or aggrieved parties before them. Regulatory bodies making 
rules, however, address future conduct. Hence, even though a deci-
sion to refrain from adopting a mandatory safety precaution is apt to 
result in some death or injury that could have been prevented, an 
agency using rulemaking acts without knowing the future victim’s 
identity. Second, rulemaking procedures force the agency to confront 
trade-offs. The agency will engage in a rulemaking with the full 
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knowledge that imposing a safety precaution of some sort makes an 
activity more expensive and perhaps creates more risk, not less.74 
D.   Focus on Attribution of Responsibility in Adjudication 
 An adjudicative process, with its emphasis on individual litigants, 
also seems more focused on attributing responsibility to individuals 
rather than to the situations in which people find themselves. Al-
though there is little research directly on point, classic studies of at-
tribution theory support this conclusion. For example, consider the 
tendency for individual actors to attribute their behavior to the prod-
uct of the situation in which they find themselves, while the observ-
ers of the same behavior attribute the actor’s behavior to the actor’s 
personality.75 Psychologists believe that this “actor-observer” effect 
results from the salience of the situation to the actor relative to the 
salience of the actor to the observer.76 The phenomenon demonstrates 
the importance of perceptual salience in identifying the determinates 
of behavior. The adjudicative process places the individual front and 
center, thereby highlighting their behavior. 
 The adjudicative emphasis on individual responsibility is arguably 
erroneous. Social psychologists have long argued that people, at least 
in Western cultures, tend to attribute behavior excessively to stable 
traits, while ignoring aspects of a situation that can induce behav-
ior.77 The ordinary social interactions of everyday life seem to focus 
our attention onto the personality of those whom we encounter, less 
so than the situations that often actually determine their behavior. 
According to Ross and Shestowsky, we are too quick to assume that 
an ordinary misstep is the result of clumsiness, rather than a wet 
floor; that a dour expression indicates an unfriendly demeanor, 
rather than a passing mood; and that the wrong answer to a trick 
question indicates low intelligence.78 The error arguably induces 
courts to attribute too much blame to individuals and not enough to 
social forces.79 
 Thus, on the whole, the rulemaking approach seems to have a 
perspective that is better suited to managing social and economic in-
teractions. Adjudicative bodies are apt to be persuaded by misleading 
signals from individual cases’ emotional content, unable to see how 
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the resolution of the disputes before them fits into a broader scale, 
and focus excessively on individual conduct rather than social forces.  
IV.   THE COGNITIVE LIMITATIONS OF RULEMAKING 
 Proceeding by rulemaking has its pitfalls as well. First, rulemak-
ing gives an agency fewer opportunities to address an issue. An 
agency proceeding by adjudication will often see an issue repeatedly, 
and in different contexts, before it makes a decision. Agencies pro-
ceeding by rulemaking, however, are apt to address the issue only 
once or twice. Second, agencies relying on rulemaking might be over-
confident in their judgments. Adjudicative bodies know that they 
lack full information about a problem because they are only resolving 
the case before them, but a rulemaking body will believe it has all 
the information it needs to make good decisions. Such conditions can 
produce overconfidence in judgments, making agencies less willing to 
revisit previous decisions. Third, because agencies proceeding by 
rulemaking do not see repeated cases, they will rely far less on the 
natural human ability to identify sensible categories from a hodge-
podge of evidence. Fourth, the lack of emotional content of the rule-
making decisions might actually be detrimental. Emotional reactions 
to situations often provide useful cues to good decisionmaking, even 
when logical analysis can be inconclusive or misleading.80 Agencies 
operating through rulemaking will not quite know how rules feel 
when applied in individual cases. This absence might undermine the 
value of rulemaking.  
A.   Limited Decisionmaking Perspectives 
 The trial-and-error process that characterizes adjudicative sys-
tems has a clear advantage. Agencies, through adjudication, can re-
view a whole range of decisions made in actual cases before making a 
final pronouncement. In contrast, rulemaking tends to be a one-shot 
game. The rulemaking process requires none of the fine sifting 
through the experiences of trial-level judges who have already en-
countered and attempted to resolve the problem. 
 In addition to less experience, the rulemaking process is more 
closely tied to a particular decision frame than the adjudicative proc-
ess. An agency relying on rulemaking approaches any social problem 
from a single, natural frame created by the status quo. Because so-
cial problems always involve a trade-off of some interests against 
others, rulemaking’s legislative approach necessarily favors the 
status quo. The cost to some interests of a change will loom large 
relative to the gains to any group that benefits from the change. In 
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contrast, approaching the same social problems through adjudication 
can undo the framing problem that an agency would otherwise face. 
An agency that proceeds by adjudication will confront cases that pre-
sent a shifting array of default conditions. Although the underlying 
rule might represent the same status quo that the agency faces, the 
parties who approach the court might come from many different posi-
tions. Trial-level judges in the agency will see the regulatory problem 
from different frames, whereas the rulemaking context leaves the 
agency trapped in a single frame.  
 Framing is just one example of the disadvantage of rulemaking’s 
one-shot approach to regulation. Many of the errors or fallacies in 
judgment that psychologists have identified are deeply contextual. 
That is, sometimes even small variations in the nature of the prob-
lem can induce decisionmakers to engage in decisions that are more 
consistent with deductive logic. Addressing a problem repeatedly 
with different facts gives the agency more chances to adopt a per-
spective that avoids logical pitfalls. To be sure, an agency relying on 
adjudication might fail to recognize a better perspective when it en-
counters one, but an agency relying on rulemaking will not even have 
the chance to see these multiple perspectives, much less choose 
among them.  
B.   Overconfidence 
 Rulemaking is a more brazen act than adjudication. When an 
agency is engaged in adjudication, it knows that it only sees one dis-
pute at a time and knows that perhaps the agency should limit its ef-
forts to solving that single dispute. Hence, these agencies are apt to 
adopt simple, straightforward solutions to problems. When an agency 
proceeds by rulemaking, however, it can adopt any solution it 
pleases, no matter how complex. Rulemaking might induce an agency 
to engage in excess tailoring. That is to say, an agency engaged in 
rulemaking might adopt a solution so closely tied to the details of a 
particular situation that the solution will fail to address the broader 
social problem.   
 The concept of excess tailoring in problems of judgment arises di-
rectly from work in psychology and statistics.81 In some circum-
stances, simple decision rules predict future results better than the 
results of a multiple regression analysis.82 The reason for this is that 
the multiple regression can “overfit” data.83 The regression model is 
so closely tailored to the unique pattern of results that it fails to un-
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cover simpler patterns in the data. Consequently, a simple rule can 
work better than a rule derived from multiple regression. Adjudica-
tive bodies, aware of the limitations of their approach, have little 
choice but to adopt simple, explicable resolution. Their authority is 
limited to simple solutions and their legitimacy depends upon their 
ability to explain their decisions in simple terms. When an agency 
proceeds by rulemaking, however, it is unlikely to resist the lure of 
complex solutions that might be excessively tailored to solving a par-
ticular version of a more general problem.  
 The problem of excessively tailored regulation is stunningly simi-
lar to the problems that regression analysis can create. The observa-
tions that a statistician feeds into a regression analysis invariably 
incorporate some measurement error. This measurement error limits 
the ability of the regression model to predict future observations 
(that is, its “reliability”). As statisticians note, the accuracy of the ob-
servations necessarily limits the reliability of the model. The regres-
sion equation, however, is itself blind to this concern. The analysis 
will produce a unique equation that best fits the data, including any 
measurement error. Statistical analysis accounts for this error by 
providing for an assessment of the predictive utility of the model (its 
R-squared).  
 The rulemaking process, however, contains no analogy to the R-
squared. No complex test exists that can assess how well the model 
fits the real solution. Even assuming the agency has the relevant in-
formation about the story, the story might not be a good one upon 
which to base a major rulemaking initiative. The story that comes to 
the attention of the agency might be idiosyncratic. It might not be a 
good reflection of the underlying social problem it represents. Indeed, 
the very fact that a story rises to the attention of the national media 
almost ensures that it has unique properties. Agencies identify a 
problem, adopt a solution to cover the problem, and then move on. 
The reliability of the anecdote upon which the agency found its solu-
tion is only rarely part of what the agency considers. 
 Agencies proceeding by adjudication might face similar problems. 
After all, they inherently deal with stories. The stories judges review 
might be inaccurate and might not be representative of the broader 
category of cases they represent. When agencies proceed by adjudica-
tion, however, they can revisit an issue as new cases arise. Their ini-
tial resolutions of disputes are also apt to be modest, inasmuch as 
agencies often refuse to address issues outside of those in the case be-
fore them. Agencies that proceed by rulemaking, however, adopt an 
omnibus solution to a social problem based largely on a single anec-
dote; courts necessarily revisit the same problem frequently.  
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C.   Failure to Rely on Categorization Skills 
 Repeated encounters with the same social issues also facilitate the 
remarkable human ability to categorize. The human brain seems 
quite adept at identifying patterns. Experts on artificial intelligence 
have as yet been unable to simulate the human power to identify 
structure and patterns. Today, machines that can make calculations 
millions of times more rapidly than the human brain still cannot rec-
ognize speech or handwriting with anything remotely like the accu-
racy that every human possesses. Chess-playing computers still can-
not match the ability of chess grand masters, whose skills arise 
largely from their ability to identify complex patterns in the pieces. 
Indeed, psychologists argue that people tend to see patterns where 
none exist.84 Superstition and myth arise largely from belief in non-
existent relationships.  
 In the development of the common law, for example, judges have 
relied heavily on pattern recognition abilities. The process of common 
law evolution consists largely of determining whether a new case is 
similar to older ones or whether a new category or exception needs to 
be carved out. Consider products liability law as an example. Prod-
ucts can injure, and have injured, people in an almost infinite variety 
of ways. And yet, the courts in the United States have managed to 
distill this infinite variation into three causes: manufacturing de-
fects, design defects, and failure to warn. Every injury a product can 
cause fits relatively neatly into one of these three causes. The courts 
have also developed a body of rules governing the allocation of re-
sponsibility for injuries attributable to each of these three causes. 
Agencies that rely on the adjudicative process, especially the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board, adopt a similar style. They decide is-
sues one case at a time and use this process to identify similarities 
and patterns in American labor relations.  
D.   Lack of Attention to Emotions 
 Finally, although sympathy is often cited as an impediment to the 
process of dispassionate reasoning necessary for adjudication, it is 
not entirely clear that emotions are so misleading. In everyday life 
emotions provide a useful guide as to how to interpret and react. 
Should this be less so in the adjudicative process? Emotional re-
sponses to various types of criminal acts or to types of plaintiffs 
probably have guided the development of the common law. But this 
is not necessarily problematic. Consider the treatment of trespassers 
by common law courts as an example. Landowners are not liable to 
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trespassers for negligent property maintenance and are responsible 
only for acts deliberately intended to harm trespassers. Surely, one 
can say that sympathies in these cases tend to lie with the landown-
ers, hence the unsympathetic rule. When the trespasser is a child, 
however, the standard for liability is higher. Again, this might result 
from shifting sympathy to the child, but the result might well be sen-
sible. Judicial sympathies might well develop sensible rather than 
foolish rules. A rulemaking process that hides the emotional aspects 
of a social decision might be missing an important cue. 
V.   RECONCILING AN INDETERMINATE ANALYSIS 
 From a cognitive perspective, each approach to regulation thus 
has advantages and disadvantages. The adjudicative approach cre-
ates a myopic focus that can induce an excess of attention to mislead-
ing details, even as it induces a kind of cautious approach that might 
avoid overconfidence and excessive regulatory tailoring. In contrast, 
the rulemaking approach can induce overconfidence and excessive 
tailoring, even as it allows the agency to concentrate on broader 
structural issues that underlie the regulatory problems an agency 
addresses. The question, then, from a cognitive perspective, is which 
features underlying a regulatory problem render it most suitable for 
rulemaking or for adjudication.    
 As a means of identifying the features of a regulatory problem 
that might support the use of one mechanism over another, consider 
three examples: environmental regulation, regulation of labor rela-
tions, and implementation of securities laws. Each has different 
characteristics that affect its suitability for rulemaking or adjudica-
tion as a means of identifying appropriate agency policy. 
 Environmental law might well present the paradigmatic case to il-
lustrate the advantages of a rulemaking approach, for several rea-
sons. First, the underlying issues in the subject present a high degree 
of scientific complexity, which requires expert explanation to the de-
cisionmakers. In an adjudicative process, this will invariably be done 
in an adversarial fashion. Quirks about the expert or the manner in 
which the information is presented can influence an adjudicative 
body’s assessment of the science, whereas a rulemaking approach 
will induce the agency to conduct more systematic surveys of the sci-
ence. Second, a rulemaking approach to environmental policy is more 
likely than adjudication to direct the agency’s attention toward 
trade-offs. Resolving an adjudication only requires an answer to a 
highly specific question posed by the parties before the adjudicative 
body. For example, a judge deciding whether a particular aluminum 
factory has incorporated the “best available control technology” un-
der the Clean Air Act might find it difficult to assess the effect of its 
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decision on the economics of aluminum production, even though the 
statute requires some consideration of economic costs.85 In contrast, if 
the EPA adopts a rule governing emissions for aluminum plants, it 
would consider the economics of the industry as a whole. In crafting 
air-quality regulations, the EPA could also assess whether there is 
any value in regulating aluminum factories more stringently or 
whether greater air-quality improvements might be had at a lower 
cost by regulating other sources of the pollution. Third, adjudication 
would focus a court’s attention to allocating blame, rather than to the 
most efficient way to regulate air quality. The assessment of whether 
the factory is a dangerous polluter or a useful employer will pre-
dominate an individual adjudication, which might well distract from 
the issue of how best to manage the adverse effects of air pollution.   
 In contrast, the regulation of labor relations might best be served 
by reliance on adjudication. One of the primary objectives of having a 
mechanism for managing relationships between unions and man-
agement is to minimize the adverse economic consequences of labor 
disputes and maintain a level playing field between unions and their 
employers.86 Regulations of labor relations are thus largely about 
maintaining peace and assigning blame, meaning that the NLRB is 
like a referee. Labor disputes are sometimes the product of an effort 
by one party to mistreat the other, which might involve risking the 
value of the company in a game of chicken. A system that emphasizes 
assignment of fault is perhaps the only sensible approach to regulat-
ing such an environment. Regulation is ill-suited to assigning blame 
for an outcome, but case-by-case adjudication will highlight the rela-
tive fault of the parties.   
  Furthermore, the ways in which employers and unions can obtain 
unfair advantages over each other and the ways in which they might 
interact that produce conflict are almost infinite and not easily pre-
dicted in advance. The system is entirely dynamic—unions and man-
agement will use any generally applicable rules to their best advan-
tage. This dynamism makes it particularly difficult for an agency to 
foresee the consequences of any rule it might adopt. Thus, many of 
the advantages of rulemaking are lost in the labor relations setting. 
If agencies truly exhibit overconfidence in their rulemaking efforts 
and undesirable preferences for the status quo, then rulemaking is 
ill-suited to a dynamic environment. An agency trying to regulate an 
adversarial setting will commonly fail to foresee what effect the rules 
it adopts have. Nevertheless, overconfidence and preferences for the 
status quo will make the rules stick even after it becomes clear that 
they have unintended consequences. Creating policy by adjudication, 
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in contrast, will produce policies with a relatively narrow scope and 
will allow for a nimble mechanism for creating exceptions to ill-
chosen policies.   
 Regulation of the securities markets presents an intermediate 
case. In many ways, the securities market is like labor relations: an 
adversarial relationship exists between those who issue or sell secu-
rities and those who buy them. That is to say, sellers benefit by ex-
tracting any extra dollar from buyers or by shifting any adverse risk 
onto the buyers. Thus, just as in the labor relations context, the par-
ties will be seeking ways to use regulations to their own advantage 
and to the disadvantage of the opposing party. In particular, sellers, 
as repeat players, will be apt to ferret out ways of using the rules to 
extract as much as they can from buyers. This regulatory environ-
ment seems just as ill-suited to regulation as the labor context.  
 At the same time, however, the relationship between buyers and 
sellers is not completely adversarial. Both buyers and sellers gain 
when sellers have the means to convey information in a credible 
fashion to buyers. Distrust and informational asymmetries are 
costly—they impede otherwise efficient transactions.87 Uniform, well-
crafted rules concerning disclosure support such an environment. 
Just as with environmental issues, such rules are probably best ac-
complished through the rulemaking process, which highlights 
broader, systemic issues, rather than the allocation of responsibility 
for undesirable investment outcomes. Thus, the regulation of the se-
curities markets emphasizes the need for a textured, problem-specific 
approach. 
 The indeterminacy of the analysis renders recommendations diffi-
cult to make. As the examples show, the underlying cognitive land-
scape varies both between and within areas of law. The variegated 
cognitive landscape might thus be said to support the wisdom of the 
Supreme Court’s approach to agency choice of rulemaking versus ad-
judication. The Court has adopted an approach that affords agencies 
unfettered choice between proceeding by rulemaking or adjudica-
tion.88 Agencies might well be in a far better position than the courts 
to asses the nature of the cognitive landscape in which they must 
regulate. Indeed, the case in which the court first embraced this 
flexibility, SEC v. Chenery Corp.,89 supports these arguments. The 
SEC asserted that it needed the flexibility to prosecute corporate 
managers engaged in a novel form of self-dealing; therefore, it noted 
that adjudication was ideal because the underlying issue was the 
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blameworthiness of the managers’ conduct.90 When the issue is the 
appropriate content of a quarterly corporate report, however, rule-
making is apt to be a more sensible approach. As to a closer case, the 
agency is apt to be in the best position to survey the landscape and 
use the most appropriate tool. 
 All of which would be a sensible conclusion, except that it is 
largely a “just-so” story. History, administrative efficiency, and the 
rigors of the rulemaking process have largely dictated agency choice. 
If so, then agencies might well be using processes that are cognitively 
ill-suited to their mission. This Article might then be taken, in part, 
as a plea to agencies to consider the cognitive landscape in which 
they operate. But in addition, could a cognitive mismatch between an 
agency’s task and its choice of procedure support an argument that 
the agency’s decision on the substantive merits should be overturned 
as arbitrary and capricious? Given the authoritative tone of the long-
standing precedent in this area,91 that seems unlikely. Nevertheless, 
I conclude with a quick sketch of the argument. 
 An agency’s decision can be said to be “arbitrary and capricious” if 
it is a rulemaking, or lacking in “substantial evidence” if it is an ad-
judication, if the agency record is incomplete.92 The obstacle to argu-
ing that the procedure is cognitively deficient is that the complete-
ness of the record is assessed from a rational-choice, rather than a 
psychological, perspective. If the record addresses all of the relevant 
issues then it can be said to be complete, regardless of the form in 
which the issues are presented or considered. The cognitive argu-
ment is more subtle than that. The concern is not that the issues are 
missing but that they are presented in such a way as to impede good 
decisionmaking. An adjudicatory approach to an issue that is best 
suited for a rulemaking approach might well include coverage of all 
of the relevant issues. After a regulated party challenges the deci-
sion, so long as the agency can assert that the record is complete, the 
agency decision will survive judicial review. Efforts to address the 
manner in which the agency makes its choice also might raise the 
concern that a reviewing court is being asked to probe into the mind 
of the administrator—which is also disfavored.93 Even though the 
way in which information is presented can improve or impede the 
quality of the decision, the manner in which the issue of agency ra-
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tionality is litigated will make the cognitive argument a challenging 
one upon which to succeed.   
 Those policymakers and scholars who already believe that regula-
tory agencies are sufficiently “ossified” would likely applaud the re-
jection of an argument that an agency approached the problem incor-
rectly. The ability of the regulated community to raise the insuffi-
ciency of the record on its own provides more than enough fodder to 
hobble administrative agencies. It seems a shame, however, that the 
courts are so unwilling to review the choice of instruments when the 
way in which the agency creates its record could be more important 
to the agency rationality than the contents of the record. As of now at 
least, an agency’s choice of policymaking instrument is apt to remain 
a lost tool of agency rationality. 
